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Emperor Has No Clothes: EU’s Cyprus Challenge
Birol A. Yeşilada
Mark Hatfield School of Government
Portland State University
In the words of the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, “membership of
[politically divided] Cyprus in the European Union coupled with Turkey’s membership
aspirations has seriously complicated future peace negotiations on the island.” (Hürriyet,
June 16, 2006). This is a rather harsh assessment of EU’s Cyprus policy given the fact
that membership in the Union would most likely create the optimal conditions for peace
and stability between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Yet, EU membership of one side at
the expense of the other community, seem to have created more obstacles for peace. This
paper provides a critical analysis of EU’s Cyprus policy. It examines: (1) the
contradictions between EU’s desire to establish direct economic and trade link with the
Turkish Cypriots and EU’s legal framework, (2) assesses agenda setting process in the
EU and its implications for relations with the Turkish Cypriots, and (3) provides ad
agent-based analysis of the current impasses surrounding (1).

A Brief Background.
There is no doubt about the seriousness of Annan’s above statement. In fact, the
combined efforts of the international community, led by the US, EU, and UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan, to solve the Cyprus problem before eastern enlargement of the EU
in May 2004 were aimed at preventing future impasse in Cyprus. That is the reason
behind closely formulating the Annan Peace plan around EU’s Accession Treaty and
relevant EU laws and regulations.
During the pre-referendum negotiations, the Annan Plan underwent five revisions.
The reformist new government in Ankara, led by the Islamist AK Party of Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, consolidated its power and withdrew support from the hard line Turkish Cypriot
leader Rauf Denktaş. With loss of such support, Denktaş’s followers lost ground in the
national elections in the TRNC in December 2003. The new Turkish Cypriot leadership,
led by Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat, signaled its willingness to support the Annan
Plan. These developments, however, coincided with national elections in the Greek part
of Cyprus where an ultranationalist former EOKA leader Tasso’s Papadopoulos
succeeded reformist and pro-unification president Chlorides. To make matters worse, the
progressive government of Semites and Papandreou in Greece lost the national elections
and was replaced by center rightist Constantine Karamanlis who did not show any sign of
pressuring Papadopoulos to accept the Annan Plan.
With this backdrop, the parties met in New York under the auspices of the Secretary
General and agreed to try to work out their differences and present a peace plan for their
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respective citizens in separate referendum prior to May 1, 2004 accession date. The
parties further agreed that if the two Cypriot leaders failed to reach a compromise,
representatives of Greece and Turkey would join them and try to reach a solution. If that
effort also failed, the Secretary General would simply “fill-in” the blanks and present the
parties a final peace document. The final Plan did not reflect a compromise the leaders
jointly endorsed. The Turkish side was more inclined to accept it whereas the Greek side
saw it as being unacceptable. Much has been written recently on the Annan Plan and the
Cyprus problem recently (for example see Anastasiou 2007, Kaufmann 2007, Lindley
2007, Loizides 2007, Sözen 2007 and Sözen and Özersay 2007).
The merits of the Annan Plan are beyond the scope of this paper. It should suffice to
state that key elements of the Annan Plan called for (International Crisis Group, March 8,
2006:3-5):
1. The Annan Plan provided for the establishment of a new federal republic, with a
United Cyprus Republic (UCR), with two constituent states – of the Greek Cypriot
community in the south and the Turkish Cypriot community in the north.
Constitutionally, the plan allocated most powers to the two constituent states, with
the federal level of government responsible principally for foreign relations,
monetary policy, federal finance, Republic citizenship and immigration.
2. The executive was to be constituted by a presidential council comprising nine
members (of which at least three would be Turkish Cypriots) holding office for five
years.
3. The presidency of the council would rotate between the two communities.
4. The federal parliament would be composed of two houses, and decisions would
normally require the approval of both chambers by simple majority, including one
quarter of the senators from each constituent state. The lower house would be
elected based on constituent state citizenship, provided that the Turkish Cypriot state
held at least one quarter of the seats. The upper house would be composed of an
equal number of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Constituent state elections
would be based on permanent residency.
5. The Supreme Court would have an equal number of Greek Cypriots, Turkish
Cypriots, and foreign members – 3 members each.
6. The Turkish Cypriot territory would comprise 29% of the island (as opposed to
36% at present).
7 A total number of 120,000 Greek Cypriots would be able to return to live in
their old houses in the North of the island. In order to avoid a flood of Greek
Cypriots, feared by the Turkish community, their proportion would be limited to
18% of the population in the Turkish Cypriot zone.
8. All Cypriot security forces were to be disbanded, and the mainland Greek and
Turkish contingents would have been reduced to 6,000 apiece by 2011 and 3,000
by 2018 (or by the date of Turkey’s EU accession). Thereafter, numbers would be
scaled down to the original 950 and 650 troops respectively foreseen in the Treaty of
Alliance, with the objective of complete demilitarization. A UN peacekeeping force,
empowered by a new mandate, would monitor implementation of the agreement.
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Unfortunately, the Annan Peace plan did not materialize. In separate referendums, the
Cypriots failed to agree on the peace plan – over three-quarters of Greek Cypriots voted
“no” while two-thirds of Turkish Cypriots voted “yes.” With these results, Greek
Cypriots joined the EU on May 1, 2004 while the Turkish Cypriots found themselves in
political limbo awaiting when and how the international community would reward their
goodwill effort.
Kofi Annan called upon the international community to eliminate economic
restrictions and barriers on the Turkish Cypriots and this was echoed by former U.S.
Secretary of State Colin Powell and EU Commissioner Verheugen, British Prime
Minister Tony Blair, and the EU Council of Ministers (prior to enlargement)
(International Crisis Group, 2006:12). Several reasons stood behind this call. First, the
international community felt obligated to compensate the Turkish Cypriots, who despite
their positive vote, would be excluded from the benefits of EU accession. Second, as
noted by the International Crisis Group (ibid) “since the Turkish Cypriot unilateral
declaration of independence in 1983, the international community has adhered to UN
Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), which called upon states not to
assist the secession of northern Cyprus. Normalising the economic situation in the north
was viewed as a form of assistance to secession.” As far as Kofi Annan was concerned,
the Turkish Cypriots’ vote for reunification invalidated the political logic of isolation.
And third, lifting the isolation was viewed as a catalyst for reunification as it would
initiate economic development of the north and bridge the gap between the two sides.
In the UN Security Council, Annan’s Cyprus report met Russian opposition and
never reached full hearing. In the EU, the situation was even more precarious. Prior to
the referendum, EU officials promised to reward the Turkish Cypriots if they voted in
favor of the Annan Plan. Following the Greek Cypriots rejection, Enlargement
Commissioner Gunter Verhuegen went even further and presented a scathing criticism of
President Papadopoulos for hijacking the EU process and for wanting to use the EU
membership to pressure the Turkish side to cave in to Greek Cypriot wishes. Similar
statement followed from the president of the European Parliament. In an attempt to
reward the Turkish side for its endorsement of the Annan Plan, Brussels Commission
prepared a policy package that would have established direct trade between north Cyprus
and EU markets and provided for 249 million euros in direct aid. Verhuegen argued that
“I am making a serious call on our member states to make a decision to stick to their
promises [to the Turkish Cypriots],” adding that the European Commission had done, and
was willing to do, everything it could to back the Turkish Cypriots (Bahceli, September
14, 2004). Despite such good will, the efforts of the Commission failed in both tasks as
the Council of Ministers ruled that the plans violated existing EU regulations since North
Cyprus (“TRNC”) could not be viewed as separate legal territory from member state
Cyprus. Therefore, all EU linkages to the Turkish side of the island would have to go
through the official government of Cyprus – which the Turkish Cypriots reject. Given
the enormity of this outcome, what legal obstacles stand in the way of EU in establishing
direct ties with Turkish Cypriots?
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Problems with EU’s Cyprus Policy and Institutional Challenges
Despite its good intentions aimed at rewarding Turkish Cypriots, the EU met legal and
administrative obstacles in its efforts. The initial plan of Verhuegen was to find a
formula for providing direct economic aid and establishing direct trade with the North.
The proposed plan would have permitted tariff free trade between the EU and North
Cyprus (for good wholly or substantially produced in the north). In order to accomplish
this goal, the Commission argued that the existing problem of “origin certificates,” which
the Greek Cypriots successfully argued in the ECJ decision of 1994, could be overcome
by recognizing certificates issued by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce since
this institution was established under the 1960 arrangement that created the Republic of
Cyprus. The Commission based its argument behind Article 133 of the EU Treaty that
regulates trade with third parties (territories) and is used to regulate trade with territories
that are part of an EU member state but are not included in its customs territory, such as
Ceuta and Melilla (Ibid). They had hoped to argue that, in lieu of referendum results and
the Council’s call for ending economic isolation of Turkish Cypriots, north Cyprus
presented such a territory.
However, the Greek Cypriots argued that the regulation fell under Protocol 10 of the
Accession Treaty (which addressed the particulars of the Cyprus problem and its linkage
to accession). As the Protocol stipulates, partial lifting of the suspension of the acquis to
the north requires unanimity in the Council. The legal office of the Council supported
this interpretation. The outcome of these interpretations has been devastating to original
intent of the Commission. Gradually, those members of the EU that wanted to see
through Commission’s goal one by one withdrew their efforts and accepted the legal
impasse. The Luxembourg, UK, and German presidencies pushed very hard to break
Cyprus’s opposition to the plan. In each case, they met Greek Cypriot veto and decided
to separate economic aid package from direct trade/air link with the north. The Greek
Cypriots even won a cheap victory in the aid package by demanding, “the passage of the
aid regulation be tied to a more restrictive interpretation by the Commission of the trade
regulation’s likely remit. When a draft of the Commission’s proposed explanatory text
reached the Turkish Cypriots, they declared it unacceptable, and the process again
collapsed, this time with the loss of €120m of the €259m package thanks to the ending of
the 2005 financial year. The aid regulation was eventually passed on 27 February 2006,
with no explanatory declaration attached.” (Ibid: 13). With success in this area, the Greek
Cypriots moved diligently to block many other attempts of Turkish Cypriots with EU
institutions that included exclusion of universities of north Cyprus from participating in
the Erasmus program (Turkish Cypriot dailies).
In a similar fashion, air link between north Cyprus and the rest of the world (except
Turkey) cannot be established as long as international conventions and the UN view
Greek Cypriot government as the legitimate representative of Cyprus. Short of the UN
Security Council’s future resolution that would lift economic isolation of the north, direct
air flights to airports in TRNC cannot be established. Thus, EU countries have been gun
shy in taking steps to establish such air link with the north.
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The above situation creates a major embarrassment for the EU as it finds itself in a
quandary. On the one hand, it wants to fulfil its promise to Turkish Cypriots. On the
other hand, it finds its hands tied by legal issues and Greek Cypriot (and probably
Greece) veto. In the meantime, the EU principles of fairness and justice remain
unfulfilled as far as Turkish Cypriots and their supporters in the EU are concerned.
The main institutional challenge for resolving this dilemma concerns agenda setting
in the EU. As long as the Commission and the Council address the Cyprus policies
within EU’s legal framework, the issue can only be addressed as part of ordinary agenda
and face all the problems explained above. That would suit the interests of Greek Cypriot
leaders who wish to transform the Cyprus problem into an intra-EU issue that can be
resolved through EU’s legal framework. Unfortunately, to them, Cyprus is still a political
problem where UN Secretary General continues to oversee international mediation
efforts. North Cyprus is technically in the EU but the acquis remains suspended until a
political solution is found to island’s division. This is because the EU admitted the whole
of Cyprus into the Union as stated in Cyprus’s application for membership and the
subsequent Accession Treaty. However, the problem Cyprus is not only a legal problem.
Fundamentally, it is a political problem which none of the existing legal framework of
the EU could address. It should be handled as an extra ordinary agenda item by the EU at
the level of the European Council (heads of states and governments). It is at this
institution where political will of all parties concerned can addressed and dealt with at the
highest level of political authority. The European Council itself sets its own
extraordinary agenda by creating special intergovernmental bodies to examine issues and
report back its recommendations, like the intergovernmental conference that the
December 2001 Laeken summit scheduled for 2004, which produced the Constitutional
Treaty (Wood and Yesilada 2007: Ch 6).
Some might argue that such a move would be futile given veto powers of member
states like Cyprus and Greece at the summit meeting of the European Council. There is
validity behind this position and this is why finding a solution should not be an EU only
effort. It has to include all relevant parties including the UN, the US, and Turkey (who
holds out on extending its Customs Union agreement to Cyprus unless the EU delivers its
promise to Turkish Cypriots). In order to examine the likelihood of resolving this
problem, I next carried out an agent-based analysis of the bargaining space on EU trade
with north Cyprus.

Agent-based Analysis of the Cyprus Bargaining Space
The agent-based model examines one issue among many that surround the Cyprus
problem. For the purposes of this paper, I only consider economic isolation of north
Cyprus and various positions stake holders prefer. Stakeholders and their positions can
be found in Appendix I. The program utilized is developed by Jacek Kugler and his
associates at the Sentia Corporation.
The algorithms that are combined in the software include game theory, decision theory
(bounded rationality), risk, and special bargaining. The methodology provides an
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explanation of how policy positions of competing interests evolve over time. It leads to
predictions about policy outcomes and identifies strategic opportunities for altering them.
The model is a substantial improvement over the earlier Expected Utility model. It is
based in part on Black’s (1958) median voter theorem and Banks’ (1990) theorem about
the monotonicity between expectations and the escalation of political disputes. The
model predicts behavior as a consequence of rational desired outcomes of the parties and
their strategic interactions, not as an extension of past behavior. This approach simulates
the shifts in position of individual stakeholders over time in response to the pressure that
occurs during bargaining. The model is driven by a game in which actors simultaneously
make proposals and exert influence on one another. They then evaluate options and build
coalitions by shifting positions on the issue in question.
The logical flow of the model assesses how decision makers evaluate whether or not
they will challenge policy if their expected value for action is positive or negative. A
stakeholder’s probability of success depends upon its ability to influence, as well as its
anticipated chance of success at convincing others to support the position advocated. The
utility for success is the policy gain the stakeholder receives by acting and changing the
policy outcome more in line with their desired position. The probability of failure is
related to the constellation of opposing stakeholders, while the utility of failure is based
on the policy consequences from a failed policy challenge.
Using this process, the model provides a complete mapping of the relationships and
perceptions of each stakeholder vis-à-vis every other stakeholder. The policy proposals
and the subsequent responses begin to give insights into the process, anticipating policy
dynamics and outcomes. In some cases, there are individual stakeholders who can apply a
veto to any settlement, despite forecasted agreement by other parties. This is not the case
in this analysis. The model thus provides a forecast of the likely settlement of policy
issues as a function of competition, confrontation, cooperation, and negotiation. Data for
the issues analyzed with this approach come from experts on the particular topic
addressed.
The model depends entirely on the policy acumen of experts. In this sense, it is a
marriage of the old and the new. It takes four key types of information from experts: who
are the stakeholders that can influence the policy outcome, what policy position do they
currently advocate, what is their relative potential influence over the process, and finally
how important is the issue to the policymaker. The approach uses only these data and
then provides specific advice that helps policy analysts understand which policy options
are likely to be successful, the sequence and timing of interventions, the nature of
interactions among stakeholders, and the types of coalitions that will form. Feder (1995)
provides a systematic assessment of the performance of expert-generated data with the
Expected Utility model using a large number of cases. He finds that while experts may
disagree with the predictions of the model, their data tend to vary only slightly and do not
produce appreciable differences in the model forecasts. This congruence suggests that the
results of the model are robust.
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Note that without a guideline for the long-term interests of a nation, many actions can
initially be seen as optimal that produce detrimental results over time. Differentiating
between successful and unsuccessful approaches is often only possible with the benefit of
hindsight. Our methodology allows policymakers and policy analysts to anticipate likely
consequences ahead of time.
This approach has a well-document track record of success, including an internal
assessment of over two thousand issues by the Central Intelligence Agency, which found
the approach to be accurate in excess of 90% of the time (study available upon request).
The model is concerned with explaining how policy positions of competing interests
evolve over time. It leads to predictions about policy outcomes and identifies strategic
opportunities for altering them. I refer the reader to Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman
(1994); Kugler and Feng (1997); and Bueno de Mesquita (2002) for details on the
mathematics behind this approach, and provide only a brief summary here.

Analysis
Policy preferences of stakeholders include a range of options where;
0=status quo
25=trade through GOC ports
50= trade through jointly administered ports in the South
75=trade through EU administered port
100=lift isolation
All players’ preferences, salience of their respective positions, and their respective
resource base are based on continues assessment of the Cyprus theatre and is part of a
larger project that brings together academics from Cyprus and the United States. Figure
1 shows position of all players during seven rounds of negotiations.
Figure 1: Stakeholders positions over time

France

US
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For identification of key actors
As negotiations continue, France is likely to move toward lifting of economic isolation of
North Cyprus coupled with US efforts aimed at the same end (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: France (round 3) and US (round 5) Move

France move
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US move

At the third round, France’s move precipitates other moves including US resulting in
large concentration of capabilities favoring lift of isolation with minimal EU involvement
(suggesting UN-level resolution). Only Greece and Greek Cypriots oppose this
liberalization but the outcome presents President Talat of TRNC an opportunity to move
DISI and Greek businesses to push for lifting of economic isolation (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Opportunity for Turkish Cypriots to move Greek Cypriots players

Talat has opportunity to
move Disi and then Greek
Business
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Conclusions and Prospects
The analysis in the paper demonstrates futility of EU’s efforts aimed at ending economic
isolation of north Cyprus and the Union’s precarious new citizens – the Turkish Cypriots.
While they received repeated assurances from the EU, the UN, and the US that they
would be rewarded for voting for the Annan Plan, Turkish Cypriots face continued
isolation from the rest of the world as political leaders of the EU quibble over when, how,
and under what circumstances they could ease these “new EU citizens” continued
punishment. The presence of Greek Cypriots in the EU, despite their rejection of the
Annan Plan, coupled with their veto of Commission’s efforts to establish direct trade with
the north simply adds insult to injury for the Turkish Cypriots. It is no wonder that
Turkish Cypriots have become cynical of future EU efforts to reach out to north Cyprus
and support for the Union has declined substantially since April 2004 as shown in recent
Eurobarometer surveys. Under these circumstances, the EU needs to take the bull by its
horns and address the problem in a combined EU-US-UN strategy. As the analysis of the
bargaining space demonstrates, there is an opportunity for France and the US to lead the
way in forging a solution by showing political leadership. France under President
Sarkozy can take the lead, supported by the UK and Germany, to emphasize the basic
ideals of the Union – compromise, fairness, and justice. The US, for its part, can use this
move to push the UN Security Council to implement recommendations of former
Secretary General Annan. With these developments, an opportunity will arise in Cyprus
for Turkish Cypriot president Talat to forge an alliance with Greek Cypriot DISI and
business leaders for ending economic isolation of north Cyprus. Such an outcome would
undoubtedly go far in bringing the two sides closer to finding a just and lasting solution
to the Cyprus problem.
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APPENDIX I

Issue 1: Economic Isolation of North Cyprus
100

0
0=status quo
25=trade through GOC ports
50= trade through jointly administered ports in the South
75=trade through EU administered port
100=lift isolation
Actor
Cypriot Turks
President Talat
CTP-BG
BDH
DP
UBP
Business Turks
Unions - Teachers
Media Pro
Media Anti
Peace Activist
UHH
Public Opinion
Greek Cypriots
Pres. Papadopoulos
Disi
Akel
Diko
Kisos
Other Parties
Business Greeks
Union Left
Union Right
CYBC
ANTENA
ERT
MEGA
SIGMA
Public Opinion
Church
Greece
PM/Karamanlis
PASOK
ERT
MEGA

Weight
10

Power

Position

Salience

70
60
5
25
35
15
15
20
5
5
5
30

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90

15
100
40
60
30
15
5
15
10
5
15
5
10
5
10
20
25

0
50
25
25
25
25
25
25
0
0
25
25
25
25
0
0

90
70
70
85
85
80
70
70
70
70
77
70
77
80
75
90

70
60
15
10

25
25
25
25

70
75
70
70

veto
power

yes
yes

45
yes
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ANTENA
Church
Business
Public Opinion
Foreign Actors
US
EU commission
Germany
UK
France
other EU
EU Parliament
UN
Turkey
Public Opinion
Opposition Parties
President
Military
Prime Minister/AKP
Media Pro
Media Anti
Business Pro
Business Islamic
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10
20
30
30

25
0
25
25

70
85
50
70

300
10
20
20
20
20
5
25

75
100
100
100
25
100
75
100

10
80
20
25
30
20
25
20

20
15
25
80
75
25
10
20
5

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

70
80
90
90
85
70
90
70
90

400

70

yes
yes
yes
yes

